Nash's three proofs for the existence of equilibria in strategic games correspond to three dynamics: The best response dynamics (equivalent to Brown's fictitious play), the smoothed best response dynamics, and the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. We prove that an equilibrium which is evolutionarily stable as defined by Maynard Smith is (globally) asymptotically stable for each of these three dynamics.
Introduction
When Maynard Smith and Price invented the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in 1973, they most likely did not envisage the big success and that they would create an entire new field: evolutionary game theory. Because of its simplicity and wide applicability this purely phenotypical concept has been adopted by many theoretical biologists in studying evolutionary phenomena. A look into journals like JTB or Selection shows how much this concept has penetrated evolutionary theory. Moreover it has turned out that in more sophisticated models, an equilibrium satisfying the ESS conditions often remains stable in some sense. For example, in the standard dynamic model for haploids, the replicator dynamics, an ESS is asymptotically stable. Similar results due to Maynard Smith, Lessard, Weissing, Cressman and others show this also for genetic models for diploids. I refer here only to Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) for a review of the present state of art in this area.
In this paper I establish a link back to the origins of (noncooperative) game theory: In fact, the replicator dynamics written down by Taylor and Jonker in 1978 was not the first game dynamics. The first dynamic models were created around 1950 by G. W. Brown as devices for computing the equilibrium strategies in zero-sum games. In the modern view of evolutionary game theory which comprises both biological and economic ideas, these early dynamics are used as population (or learning) models of agents who behave more rationally than biological replicators or imitators.
In this paper we show that Maynard Smith's ESS notion helps also towards understanding these early dynamics for general, non-zero-sum games. We prove that an ESS is asymptotically stable also for these first dynamic models due to Brown and other economically motivated dynamics.
The paper is structured as follows: We reexamine the three proofs which Nash gave for the existence of equilibria (section 2) and explain how they relate to the game dynamics introduced by Brown, von Neumann, and Fudenberg and Levine (section 3) . Section 4 contains the main results of this paper: the (global) stability of ESS. In section 5 analogs of Fisher's fundamental theorem (increase of mean payoff) are given. We conclude with more general dynamics.
Nash equilibria
We restrict to finite symmetric 2 person games. Such a game is described by an n × n payoff matrix A = (a ij ). The real number a ij denotes the payoff which strategy i receives when playing against j. We assume that there is a large population of players, each committed (for some time) to one of the pure strategies. Let x i = x i (t) ≥ 0 be the frequency of strategy i in the population at time t.
The probability simplex ∆ ⊂ R n (of dimension n -1) is then the set of all possible population profiles x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) (with x i ≥ 0 and
) which correspond to the mixed strategies in classical game theory
Another equivalent condition is
The existence of such points is not obvious and was proved by Nash (in the more general context of finite N person games). Actually he gave three different proofs in (Nash, 1950a (Nash, , b, 1951 . Theorem 2.1 (Nash 1950 (Nash /1951 
the set of all (mixed) best responses to x (which forms a subsimplex of ∆) then (1) is equivalent to
The existence of such an ] follows now directly from Kakutani's (1941) fixed point theorem for setvalued maps. 2
Second proof
In his unpublished thesis Nash (1950b) essentially considers a family of continuous functions b ε ε ( ) > 0 with 1. each b ε is a continuous map from ∆ into ∆ and 2. for each x ∈ ∆, all limit points of b ε (y), as ε → 0 and y → x, are contained in BR(x). By Brouwer's fixed point theorem each of these approximate best response maps has a fixed point ] ε in ∆ :
follows from the second property above.
Actually Nash (1950b) , see also Leonard (1994, p. 500, footnote 18) , considers the particular family (or rather the sequence with ε = 1/n)
where u + = max (u, 0) denotes the positive part. Only strategies which lose at most ε compared to the maximal payoff are used in this approximate best response.
1 Besides the conception of ESS there are two features in Maynard Smith's EGT that distinguish it from the classical game theoretic literature say up to 1990: The emphasis of symmetric games and the view of a whole population of agents playing the same game. It came as a big surprise when Leonard (1994) pointed to the last chapter in Nash's thesis (1950b) which was not included in the final publication from 1951 where such a population interpretation (mass action interpretation) is given: equilibria are simply equilibria (= stationary points) of the BR dynamics. Also symmetric games are emphasised in Nash (1950b Nash ( , 1951 .
2 Nash (1950a) thanks 'David Gale for suggesting the use of Kakutani's theorem to simplify the proof'. It may be interesting to note that Kakutani's motivation was to give a simpler proof of the minimax theorem, i.e. the existence of equilibria in zero-sum games.
More interesting and even smooth versions of such perturbed best-response maps are obtained by regularizing the optimization problem (3) which defines Nash equilibria: Consider the modified payoff function
where v is a strictly concave function. More precisely we require that v: int ∆ → R is twice differentiable, the second derivative v"(x) is negative definite for each x in the interior of ∆ and |v′(x)| → ∞ as x approaches the boundary of ∆. Typical examples are
and
The latter choice has the advantage that the maximizer
can be explicitly computed as
In any case the assumptions on v imply that the maximizer b ε (x) in (9) is unique, depends smoothly on x and ε, and approaches BR(x) as ε → 0. This elegant modification of Nash's (1950b) ansatz arose recently from a stochastic learning model for games, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998, chs 4 and 8) .
Third proof
Nash's final proof from the Annals of Mathematics (1951) is much more streamlined and is reproduced in many texts on game theory, e.g. Owen (1982) . It simply applies Brouwer's fixed point theorem to the continuous map f : ∆ → ∆ defined by
where
and u + = max (u, 0). This map is similar to Nash's perturbed BR map (5) but now all strategies doing better than average are considered. It is easy to see that ] is a fixed point of f if and only if k i (]) = 0 for all i, i.e. ] is an equilibrium of the game.
Dynamics
Summarizing, these three proofs correspond to three maps on ∆:
Iterating these maps leads to dynamical systems on ∆ in discrete time. Now continuous time dynamics usually behave more reasonably. 3 Hence we consider the differential equations corresponding to the above three maps.
The best response dynamics (BR)
2. the perturbed (or smoothed) BR dynamics
3. the BNN dynamics
While the second of these, (14), with b ε defined by (9), was introduced rather recently, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998, ch. 4) , the other two, (13) and (15) 
They show convergence to equilibrium for these games. In this dynamics the proportions of the pure strategies that are below average decrease at the same rate. Only strategies doing better than average can increase. The right-hand side of (15) is not smooth but still Lipschitz continuous. Hence the differential equation (15) has a unique solution to each initial condition. The best response dynamics (BR) was formulated in the above form by Gilboa and Matsui (1991) : In a very large population, in each small time interval a few players revise their strategy and switch to a best reply against the current population profile x. These players are rational, but myopic: they do not anticipate the results of their actions. With a different interpretation as a learning process, but in a mathematically equivalent form, the best response dynamics was already introduced as fictitious play by Brown (1949 Brown ( , 1951 . Due to the discontinuity or possible multivaluedness of BR(x), (13) is actually a differential inclusion. Existence of solutions (these are Lipschitz functions x(t) satisfying the inclusion (13) for almost all times t) follows from the general theory. On the other hand, one can explicitly construct piecewise linear solutions (in a not necessarily unique way) through each initial condition. It is shown in Hofbauer (1995) , that it is sufficient to consider these piecewise linear solutions.
One of the attractive features of the smoothed best response map (9) is that because of our assumptions on v, b ε is a smooth function of x and hence (14) has unique solutions, in contrast to the discontinuous differential equation (BR).
Evolutionarily stable strategies
According to the definition of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) 
with ξ ≠ 0.
The condition (16) says that the mean payoff x · Ax is a strictly concave function on ∆. Conversely, games satisfying (16) have a unique ESS (possibly on the boundary) which is also the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, p. 72) . The slightly weaker condition
includes also the limit case of zero-sum games and games with an interior equilibrium that is a neutrally stable strategy (i.e., equality is allowed in (ii)) as defined by Maynard Smith (1982), see also Weibull (1995) . Games satisfying (17) need no longer have a unique equilibrium, but the set of equilibria is still a nonempty convex subset of ∆.
The best reply dynamics

Theorem 4.1 Consider a game with (17). Then the convex set of its equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for the best-response dynamics (13). In particular, if ] is an interior ESS then ] is globally asymptotically stable for (13). Moreover all (piecewise linear) paths reach ] in finite time.
Proof. Consider the convex function
which satisfies V(x) ≥ 0, and V(x) = 0 if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium. Hence the set of equilibria is convex. Along a linear piece ô = b -x of a solution of (13), one has V = (b -x) · Ax and
Since the second term is nonpositive due to (17) we get V ≤ -V ≤ 0. This shows the global asymptotic stability of the equilibrium set {V = 0}. If ] is an interior ESS then the second term in (19) is negative and even bounded away from 0 since b is on the boundary of ∆ unless x = ]. Hence V(x(t)) decreases strictly and reaches the value 0 in finite time. @ Actually more can be shown, see Hofbauer (1995) : If (16) holds, then there is a unique solution to (13) through each initial value. If ] is an ESS on the boundary of ∆ then it is locally asymptotically stable for (13). The ESS assumption can be considerably relaxed. Moreover, these local and global stability assertions hold also for Brown's discrete fictitious play process.
As a special case we recover a version of Brown's (1951) result: For a symmetric zero-sum game, all solutions of (13) converge to the set of equilibria.
The smoothed BR dynamics
We start with a simple lemma which shows that the directional derivative of the modified payoff function F(z, x) at z = x pointing towards z = b ε (x) is positive at every x (with the obvious exception of an ε-equilibrium where b ε (x) = x). (∂ 1 denotes the derivative with respect to the first variable.)
with equality only when b e (x) = x.
Proof. Since ∂ 1 F(b ε (x), x) = 0 from (9), the claim is equivalent to
This follows easily from the fact that F(⋅, x) is a strictly concave function on int ∆ in its first variable. Proof. Consider the function
Theorem 4.2 Let the game satisfy (17
which is nonnegative by definiton of b ε and vanishes precisely at points x ∈ ∆ with b ε (x) = x, i.e. the rest points of (14). Moreover, V is strictly convex and hence attains its minimum value 0 at a unique such point. Then
The first expression vanishes, since ∂ 1 F(b ε (x),x) = 0 by definition (9) of b ε (x), the second term is taken care of by the Lemma, and the last two terms simplify to (b ε -x) ⋅ Aô = ô ⋅ Aô which is nonpositive thanks to the negative semidefiniteness assumption (17). Hence V ≤ 0 with equality only at the unique ε-equilibrium, and V is a global Lyapunov function.
The convergence of ] ε → ] as ε → 0 follows from the closed graph of the BR-correspondence, see section 2.2. @ The local stability of interior ESS was already shown by Hopkins (1999) . From his elegant expression for the linearization of (14),
with C a symmetric positive definite matrix depending on v, one can easily derive the following converse result: If an (isolated) interior equilibrium ] generates nearby (locally asymptotically) stable ε-equilibria ] ε after small perturbation with all admissable choices of v then A satisfies the negative semidefiniteness condition (17). Hence ] is a neutrally stable strategy, i.e. 'almost' an ESS.
The Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
Theorem 4.3 For every game with (17) the set of its equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for (15). In particular, an interior ESS is globally asymptotically stable for (15).
Proof. Let us first compute the derivative of k i . If
Consider now the con-
The first term is nonpositive due to (17), and the second term is nonnegative because of
Hence V(x) < 0 for all x outside the equilibrium set, and V is a global Lyapunov function. @ This theorem contains also the classical result of Brown and von Neumann (1950) 
as special case: For a zero-sum game A = -A T , the set of equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for (15).
For ESS on the boundary, local stability can be shown at least under an additional regularity assumption. I refer to Berger and Hofbauer (1998) for this and many other results on the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.
Fisher's fundamental theorem
We consider now games with a symmetric payoff matrix A = A T (a ij = a ji for all i, j). Such games are known as partnership games and potential games. The basic population genetic model of Fisher is equivalent to the replicator dynamics for such games, which is then a gradient system with respect to the Shahshahani metric and the mean payoff as potential, see e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) . The resulting increase of mean fitness or mean payoff x · Ax in time is often referred to as the fundamental theorem of natural selection. This statement about the replicator dynamics generalizes to the dynamics considered in this paper.
The generalization is based on the concept, defined by Swinkels (1993) , of a (myopic) adjustment dynamics which satisfies ô ⋅Ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ ∆, with equality only at equilibria. If A = A T then the mean payoff x · Ax is increasing for every adjustment dynamics since (x · Ax) · = 2 ô ⋅ Ax ≥ 0. It is obvious that the best-response dynamics (13) is an adjustment dynamics and, as shown in (21), (15) is as well (see (27) below for its generalization to (23)). As a consequence, we obtain the following result. (in particular (13) , (15) and (23)) converges to (a connected set of) equilibria.
Theorem 5.1 For every potential game A = A T , every trajectory of every adjustment dynamics
For the perturbed BR dynamics there is the following modification, thanks to the lemma in section 4.2.
Theorem 5.2 For every potential game, the function P(x) = ½ x × Ax + e v(x) increases monotonically along solutions of (14) and hence every solution converges to (a connected set) of e-equilibria.
Proof.
according to the Lemma, with equality only at ε-equilibria. @
Generalized "Brownian motion"
Let f: R + → R + be a continuous function with
Then, recalling the definiton (12) of k i (x), we consider the dynamics
(23) 
and V " " j" = ′ = =
Conclusion
Two families of game dynamics have been presented for which interior ESS are globally asymptotically stable: the family (23) which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics as the simplest special case, and the perturbed BR dynamics (14). Both contain the BR dynamics (Brown's fictitious play) as limit case. Both families are large, infinite dimensional in fact, as an arbitrary function (f in the first case, v in the second case) can be chosen. The replicator dynamics (together with a few of its relatives) is the only other dynamics known so far to enjoy this fundamental property that an interior ESS is globally asymptotically stable. The global stability results presented here are even stronger than those for the replicator dynamics, as they hold under the weaker assumption of (17). In particular they include the limit case of zero-sum games for which the replicator dynamics yields only neutral stability for interior equilibria. Apparently Maynard Smith's ESS concept has to offer as much to these rationalistic game dynamics originating in Brown's and Nash's work as to the evolutionary dynamics of replicators.
